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Abstract
We introduce two three sided adaptative systems as toy models to mimic
the exchange of commodities between buyers and sellers. These models are
simple extensions of the minority game, exhibiting similar behaviour as well
as some new features. The main difference between our two models is that in
the first the three sides are equivalent while in the second, one choice appears
as a compromise between the two other sides. Both models are investigated
numerically and compared with the original minority game.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider exten-
sions of the bar-attendance problem
introduced by Arthur [1] and simpli-
fied into a minority game by Challet
and Zhang [2]. In its simplest form,
the minority game mimics the inter-
nal dynamic of the exchange of one
commodity. Agents are allowed to
buy or sell this commodity at each
time step. No attempt is made to
model any external factors that in-
fluence the market. Here, we in-
troduce symmetric and asymmetric
three sided games as extensions of the
minority game.
In the symmetric three sided
model, the agents have to choose be-
tween three identical sides at each
time step. These three sides are trad-
ing with each other, agents on one
side buying from the second side to
sell to the third. This model mim-
ics the cyclic trading of goods. If we
group any two sides together and con-
sider the trading between this imag-
inary group and the third side, the
model reduces to a kind of minority
game with an uneven distribution of
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the agents. Hence, the connection be-
tween this model and the minority
game is very strong.
In the asymmetric three sided
model, the agents can buy or sell a
commodity at each time step, but
they can also be inactive, that is,
they are allowed to miss a turn.
In contrast to the symmetric model,
the three choices are not equivalent,
as being inactive appears as a com-
promise between buying and selling.
This model can be thought of as
an open minority game in the sense
that the agents buying and selling are
playing a minority game with a vari-
able number of agents at each turn.
In Sec. 2, the minority game
is briefly recalled and the two new
three sided models are described in
detail. In Sec. 3, the symmetric
three sided model is numerically in-
vestigated, while in Sec. 4, the asym-
metric three sided model is investi-
gated. Sec. 5 presents a comparison
between the minority game and the
two three sided models, as well as our
conclusions.
2 The models
In the minority game, an odd
number N of agents have to choose
between two sides, 1 or 2, at each time
step. An agent wins if he chooses the
minority side. The record of which
side was the winning side for the last
m time steps constitutes the history
of the system. The agents analyze the
history of the system in order to make
their next decision.
In the symmetric three sided
model, a number of agents N have to
choose between three sides, 1, 2 or 3,
at each time step. N is not a multiple
of 3. The agents on side 1 buy from
side 2 to sell to side 3, the agents on
side 2 buy from side 3 to sell to side
1 and the agents on side 3 buy from
side 1 to sell to side 2. This cyclic
trading pattern is shown in Fig. 1. It
is assumed that the profit or loss at a
side is reflected in the difference be-
tween the number of agents they are
selling to and the number of agents
they are buying from. For instance,
N3 − N2 is a measure of the profit
of side 1. Agents choosing the side
with the highest profit win and are
rewarded with a point. Agents choos-
ing the side with the lowest profit
lose and consequently lose a point.
Agents choosing the side with the in-
termediate profit neither lose nor gain
a point. Agents strive to maximize
their total number of points.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the symmetric three sided model. The
arrows indicate the direction of the exchange. Ni is the number of agents
choosing side i.
In the asymmetric three sided
model, a number of agents N also
have to choose between three sides,
1, 2 or 3, at each time step. 1 corre-
sponds to selling, 2 to doing nothing
and 3 to buying. The agents buy-
ing or selling are said to be active,
while the agents doing nothing are
said to be inactive. The agents choos-
ing the smaller group among buyers
and sellers win and are rewarded with
a point. The agents choosing the
larger group among buyers and sellers
lose and they lose a point. The points
of the inactive agents don’t change.
If there is the same number of buy-
ers and sellers, the points of all the
agents remain unchanged. However,
the inactive agents are recorded as
winners in the history of the system,
on the grounds that they achieved the
same result as the buyers and sellers,
but without taking any risk. Again,
agents strive to maximize their total
number of points.
In each model, the record of which
side was the winning side for the last
m time steps constitutes the history
of the system. For a given m, there
are 3m different histories. The 9 dif-
ferent histories for m = 2 are listed
in the first column of table 1. Every
agent makes a decision for the next
time step according to the history of
the system. To be able to play, an
agent must have a strategy that al-
lows him to make a decision for any
of the 3m different histories. The sec-
ond and third columns of table 1 list
3
History σ σ′
(1,1) 3 2
(1,2) 1 3
(1,3) 2 2
(2,1) 2 1
(2,2) 3 3
(2,3) 1 1
(3,1) 3 1
(3,2) 2 2
(3,3) 3 1
Table 1: The first column lists all
the possible histories of the system
for the last 2 time steps (m = 2).
A strategy is a set of decisions for
all the different possible histories.
Two example strategies σ and σ′
are shown in the second and third
columns.
two possible sets of decisions, σ and
σ′, that we will call strategies.
Each agent has at his disposal a
fixed set of s strategies chosen at ran-
dom, multiple choices of the same
strategy being allowed. At any one
moment in time, the agent only uses
one of these strategies to make a de-
cision. To allow an agent to decide
which strategy to use, every strategy
is awarded points, which are called
virtual points. The virtual points of
a strategy are the points the agent
thinks he could have earned had he
played with this strategy. Hence,
the virtual points are rewarded us-
ing the same scheme as the points
given to the agents, the prediction of
a strategy being compared to the ac-
tual decisions. A strategy predicting
the winning side is awarded a virtual
point, a strategy predicting the losing
side loses a virtual point and a strat-
egy predicting the third side does not
gain or lose any points. In the asym-
metric model, in the case of an equal
number of buyers and sellers, the vir-
tual points of all strategies remain un-
changed. An agent always plays with
the strategy with the highest number
of virtual points. When more than
one strategy has the highest number
of virtual points, one of them is cho-
sen at random.
If we compare two strategies σ
and σ′ component by component, we
see that for some histories they can
make the same prediction and for oth-
ers they can make different predic-
tions. In the example in table 1,
the decisions differ when the history
is (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), (3,1) and (3,3).
To consider this feature, we have to
distinguish between the symmetric
model and the asymmetric one. For
the former, the three sides are equiv-
alent and only the number of differ-
ences between the strategies can give
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a measure of the difference between
two strategies in the strategy space.
For the latter, there is a qualitative
difference between the three sides.
This qualitative difference should ap-
pear in the definition of the difference
between strategies.
Consider first the symmetric three
sided model. As the three sides are
equivalent, a geometrical representa-
tion should put them at the same dis-
tance from one another. A conve-
nient measure of the differences be-
tween two strategies σ and σ′ is
ds =
1
3m
3m∑
i=1
δ(σi − σ
′
i
) (1)
where δ(0) = 1, and δ(x) = 0 oth-
erwise. ds is defined as the distance
between strategies in the symmetric
model. This definition takes into ac-
count the geometrical structure of the
strategy space, including the equiva-
lence between the three sides. In the
example of table 1, ds = 5/9. By def-
inition, the symmetric distance is a
number ranging from 0 to 1.
As Eq. (1) shows, the symmetric
distance ds is defined as a sum of 3
m
terms, which we label d(i)
s
’s. Each of
these terms is equal to 0 with prob-
ability 1/3 or equal to 1 with proba-
bility 2/3. The average distance be-
tween two strategies is ds = 2/3,
while the variance of the symmetric
distance distribution is σ2
s
= 2/3m+2.
The symmetric distance between two
strategies corresponds to the proba-
bility that these two strategies will
give different predictions, assuming
that all the histories are equally likely
to occur. The symmetric distance
corresponds to the distance defined in
the minority game [3]. Two strategies
at ds = 0 are correlated, two strate-
gies at ds = 2/3 are uncorrelated and
two strategies at ds = 1 are anticor-
related.
In the asymmetric three sided mi-
nority game, selling is just the op-
posite decision to buying while do-
ing nothing is a compromise. Conse-
quently, the normalized asymmetric
distance between strategies σ and σ′,
da =
1
3m
3m∑
i=1
|σi − σ
′
i
|
2
(2)
is a measure of the difference between
the two strategies. da is defined as
the distance between strategies in the
asymmetric model. This definition
takes into account the fact that buy-
ing is more different from selling than
it is from being inactive in an arbi-
trary way. In the example of table 1,
da = 4/9. By definition, the asym-
metric distance is a number ranging
from 0 to 1.
As shown by Eq. (2), the asym-
metric distance da is defined as a sum
of 3m terms we label d(i)
a
’s. When the
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component of a strategy is equal to 2,
this component can never give a d(i)
a
equal to 1. In other words, the in-
active side has no side at distance 1
from itself. Considering all the possi-
bilities, the probability to find a d(i)
a
of 0 is 1/3, of 0.5 is 4/9 and of 1
is 2/9. The average asymmetric dis-
tance between strategies is da = 4/9,
while the variance of the asymmet-
ric distance distribution is equal to
σ2
a
= 11/3m+4. The interpretation of
this asymmetric distance is ambigu-
ous. In fact, the opposite to selling is
buying, but the opposite to being in-
active is being inactive. Hence, da is
not a measure of the probability that
two strategies would give opposite de-
cisions. Two correlated strategies are
at ds = 0 from each other, two un-
correlated strategies are at da = 1/2
from each other, but two anticorre-
lated strategies can be at da = 0 or
da = 1 from each other.
3 Numerical results
for the symmetric
model
In this section, we report on nu-
merical investigations of the prop-
erties of the symmetric three sided
model, interpreting the results using
the symmetric distance.
Fig. 2 presents a typical result for
the time evolution of the attendance
at one side. The simulation is for
N = 101 agents with s = 2 strategies
each and a memory of m = 3. The
result for the attendance at one side
is very similar to the results of the
minority game, the mean attendance
being shifted to N/3 instead of N/2.
Given an agent choosing one side, the
average distance between the strategy
used by this agent and the strategies
used by the other agents is d = 2/3.
That is, around 2/3 of the agents
should choose one of the two other
sides. Hence, the average attendance
at one side is N/3.
The variance of the attendance at
one side as a function of the size of
the memory m is presented at Fig.
3 for N = 101 agents with s = 2
strategies. The result is again very
similar to the minority game, with a
very high variance for m < 3, a min-
imum at m = 3 and the variance go-
ing to 2N/9, the random value, as m
goes to infinity. Curves of the same
shape are obtained for the variance
of the number of winners or the vari-
ance of the number of losers. Also,
the maximum profit or the number
of agents on the more crowded side
exhibit the same behaviour. Each
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Figure 2: Numerical simulation of the attendance at one side for the sym-
metric three sided model. The choice for the parameters is N = 101, s = 2
and m = 3.
of these curves has a minimum for
m = 3. For m < 3, the number of
strategies used at each time step is
a representative sample of the space
of the strategies. Consequently, the
variance of the attendance is directly
related to the variance of the dis-
tance distribution, σ2
s
= 2/3m+2. In
fact, the variance of the attendance
scales like 1/σ2
s
. On the contrary, for
m > 3, the space of the strategies is
very large, so that most of the strate-
gies used are uncorrelated. As a re-
sult, the kinetics of the system are
the same as the kinetics of a random
walk. Between these two behaviours,
for m around 3, the agents organize
themselves better, a crowd-anticrowd
effect being obtained [4].
Even for small values of m, the
space of strategies is very large, of size
33
m
. But as in the minority game, not
all the strategies are uncorrelated. If
we suppose that 1/σ2
s
gives an esti-
mate of the number of uncorrelated
strategies, the method of Johnson et
al. [4] can be used to find an ana-
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Figure 3: Variance of the number of agents at one side as a function of the
size of the memory m (×) for N = 101 and s = 2 (symmetric model). The
analytical results using the calculation of Johnson et al. [4] is also shown
(✷).
lytical expression for the variance of
the attendance at one side. We fol-
lowed the original calculation in [4],
with a size a = 3m+2/2 for the space
of strategies and a variance of 2/9 for
an independent agent. The analyt-
ical result obtained by this method
is compared in Fig. 3 to the result
of the numerical simulations. The
curves agree qualitatively.
Fig. 4 (a) presents a typical re-
sult for the average number of points
given to the agents and their strate-
gies. The parameters of the simula-
tion are N = 101, s = 2 and m = 3.
Note that there are two different ordi-
nate scales. As Fig. 4 (a) shows, the
virtual points are steadily decreasing
with time. In contrast, the points
given to the agents display a more
complex behaviour. The points given
to the agents increase very slowly for
m < 3 and then oscillate around 0 for
m > 3. There seem to be no special
behaviour for m = 3. The time evo-
lution of the virtual points can be ap-
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τ
Figure 4: (a) Average points earned by the agents and their strategies as a
function of the time for N = 101, s = 2 and m = 3. The ordinate on the
left refers to the points of the agents (bold line) while the ordinate on the
right refers to the points of their strategies (simple line). (b) Profit rate of
the strategies as a function of m for N = 101 and s = 2.
proximated by a linear relation with
a profit rate τ . We define τ as the
average number of points earned by a
strategy at each time step. Fig. 4 (b)
presents τ as a function of the mem-
ory m for N = 101 and s = 2. For
m < 3, the strategies are slowly los-
ing points, the worst results being ob-
tained for m = 3. For m > 3, the vir-
tual points oscillate around 0. Hence,
the agents seem to be able to choose
their strategy efficiently, in the sense
that the strategies they choose win
more often than the average strat-
egy. This behaviour is to be con-
trasted with the minority game where
the agents are not able to choose a
strategy efficiently.
As a summary, the symmetric
model is a direct extension of the mi-
nority game to three sides. The re-
sults found are very similar, with a
glassy phase transition [5] when the
size of the memory of the agents is
increased. We numerically identified
a critical value mc for the size of the
memory. For m < mc, the space of
strategies is crowded and its geomet-
rical structure is apparent in the re-
sults. As this structure is encoded in
the distance definition, the system is
driven by its distance distribution .
For m > mc, the number of strate-
gies used is not relevant as most of
the strategies used are uncorrelated.
The kinetics of the system reduce to
agents choosing one of the three sides
at random. Hence, there is a transi-
tion from a system driven by its dis-
tance distribution to a random sys-
tem.
4 Numerical results
for the asymmetric
model
We investigated numerically the
different properties of the asymmet-
ric three sided game. In the figures, 1
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denotes buying, 2, doing nothing and
3, selling.
The attendance of the three dif-
ferent sides as a function of the size
of the memory m is plotted at Fig.
5 for N = 101 agents, playing with
s = 2 strategies each. The number
of agents in the winning side is also
presented. For small m values, most
of the agents are buying or selling
(the two superimposed upper curves).
Just a few of them are doing noth-
ing (the lower curve for small m val-
ues). As the size of the memory
is increased, the system corresponds
more and more to the agents guess-
ing at random between the three pos-
sibilities. Also, for small values of
m, the number of winners is signif-
icantly more than 1/3, the random
guess value. Fig. 5 is interesting be-
cause the difference between the three
sides is clearly apparent.
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Figure 5: Numerical result for the average attendances at the three sides as
functions of m for N = 101 and s = 2. The two upper curves (△ and©) are
for the selling and buying options. The lower curve (×) is for the inactive
agents. The average number of winners is also presented (✷) as a function
of m for the same choice of parameters.
10
In Fig. 6, the variance of the at-
tendances at the three sides and the
variance of the number of winners
are presented as functions of m for
N = 101 and s = 2. For m < 6,
the variance of the number of inac-
tive agents is significantly higher than
2N/9, the value for agents guessing at
random. The variances of the num-
ber of buyers and sellers has a min-
imum at m = 2. The variances of
the three sides increase to 2N/9 as m
increases. Hence, there seems to be
an organization of the agents for m
around 2. The variance of the num-
ber of winners has a shape very sim-
ilar to the one found in the minority
game. For small value of m, the vari-
ance diverges like a power law ofm; at
m ≃ 7, it seems to reach a minimum
and for higher values of m, it goes
asymptotically to a value near N/9.
However, the existence of a minimum
at m = 7 could not be confirmed un-
equivocally by the numerical simula-
tions.
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Figure 6: Variances of attendances at the three sides as functions of m for
N = 101 and s = 2. △ and©, selling and buying options, × inactive agents.
✷ is the variance of the number of winners as a function of m for the same
choice of parameters.
11
Fig. 5 and 6 show that for small
m values, the behaviour of the sys-
tem is directly related to the proper-
ties of the distance distribution. The
proportion of people buying or sell-
ing is of the same order as the av-
erage distance, 4/9, while the vari-
ance of the number of winners scales
as 1/σ2
a
, the inverse of the variance of
the asymmetric distance distribution.
These properties were also present in
the minority game. In this asymmet-
ric model, the variance of the atten-
dance at one side does not represent
the wasted number of points. The
wasted number of points is defined to
be the difference between the maxi-
mum points that can be earned by
the system at each time step and the
average points actually earned by the
system at each time step. This is why
we also have to consider the proper-
ties of the number of winners in ad-
dition to the properties of the atten-
dances.
For higher values of m, the strat-
egy space is so large that most of the
used strategies are uncorrelated. The
system is similar to a system with
agents choosing at random from the
three sides. In the minority game, the
relative attendance predicted by the
distance distribution is the same as
the one predicted by random guesses,
that is 1/2. In the present three sided
minority game, these two ratios are
4/9 and 1/3 respectively. Hence, the
transition from a system driven by
the distance distribution to a system
of agent guessing at random is seen
directly in the attendance of the dif-
ferent sides.
Fig. 7 presents the average suc-
cess rate of one side, that is, the prob-
ability that at any one moment in
time, one side will win. As expected,
the sides corresponding to buying and
selling are symmetric and more likely
to win than the inactive side. In fact,
there are (N + 1)(N + 2)/2 differ-
ent configurations for the attendances
of the 3 sides. Among these, only
(N + 2)/2 make the inactive agents
winners if N is even, (N+1)/2 if N is
odd. Hence, if all the situations were
equally likely to occur, the inactive
agents would win at most about ev-
ery N+1 time steps. This is the order
of the asymptotical value for the suc-
cess rate of this side. For low values
of m, the success rate of the inactive
side is higher than the asymptotical
value, implying that the agents play-
ing are organizing themselves rather
well. The transition between orga-
nized and non-organized agents is for
m = 2 in Fig. 7.
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Figure 7: Success rates of the three different sides as functions of m for
N = 101 and s = 2. The two upper curves (△ and ©) are for selling and
buying while the lower curve (×) is for the inactive agents.
Fig. 8 confirms the organization
of the agents. The profit rates of the
agents and their strategies are shown
as functions of m. We define a profit
rate as the average number of points
earned at each time step. For val-
ues of m less than m = 5, the agents
are able to choose strategies which
are more successful than the average
ones. On the contrary, for m > 5,
they are doing worse than guessing
at random. The curve of the profit
rate of the strategies suggests that the
transition takes place for m = 2.
As a summary, in the asymmet-
ric three sided minority game, agents
playing with a small memory win
more points on average than agents
playing with a bigger memory in a
pure population, that is, a population
of all the agents with the same mem-
ory size m. As in the minority game
and the symmetric three sided model,
a glassy phase transition [5] is found
at a particular value of the memory
mc. For m < mc, the geometrical
properties of the space of strategies
is apparent, especially the asymme-
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Figure 8: Average profit rates of the agents and their strategies as functions
of m for N = 101 and s = 2. ✷ is for the profit rate of the agents while ©
is for the profit rate of their strategies.
try between the three sides. Most of
the agents are playing and the sys-
tem is driven by the distance distri-
bution. In contrast to the minority
game, this property is seen directly
in the number of agents on each side.
For m > mc, the strategies used are
uncorrelated and the system is similar
to a system of agents guessing at ran-
dom. Considering the adaptation of
the agents, they are unable to realize
that the wiser choice is to decide to
be inactive. In fact, more than half
of the active agents will lose. The
agents are fooled because they base
their confidence in virtual points, not
on their profit. Hence, the agents are
always tempted to play even if they
are unlikely to win.
5 Conclusions
We introduced two three sided
models as extensions of the minority
game. In the symmetric three sided
model, agents are given three equiv-
alent choices while in the asymmet-
ric three sided model, agents have the
opportunity to miss a turn and not
play. We have investigated these two
new models numerically and com-
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pared the results with the original mi-
nority game.
In both models, we defined a dis-
tance between the strategies of the
agents. These distances incorporate
in their definitions the geometrical
structure of the space of strategies. In
the symmetric model, the geometrical
structure of the space of strategies is
very similar to the one in the minority
game. The distance gives a measure
of the correlation between two strate-
gies. Conversely, the distance in the
asymmetric model has no obvious in-
terpretation.
A transition between a system
driven by the distance distribution
and a system of agents guessing at
random was identified numerically in
both models. However, in contrast to
the minority game, the agents make
their highest profit for m small and
not at the transition value of m. In
the distance driven phase, the agents
organize themselves, as in the minor-
ity game. In contrast to the minor-
ity game, however, the average profit
rate of the agents is higher than the
average profit rate of the strategies,
indicating that the agents are choos-
ing their strategies efficiently. In the
symmetric model, the transition is
apparent in the variance of the num-
ber of agents choosing one side while
in the asymmetric model the transi-
tion is seen in the number of agents it-
self. This latter property of the asym-
metric model is a direct consequence
of the geometrical structure of the
space of strategies.
In the future, we intend to in-
vestigate both models analytically.
The symmetric model, in particu-
lar, should be amenable to analyti-
cal treatment, perhaps following the
methods introduced in [6] for the two
sided minority game.
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